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W h e n J u s t i c e B l a c k m u n w ro t e

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-

cals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the assignment was to reconcile the standards

governing the admissibility of expert
testimony with Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

As Justice Blackmun rec-

ognized, Frye v. United States, 293 F.

1013

(D.C.

C i r.

1923),

had

long

served as the polestar for determin-

ing the admissibility of expert testimony in litigation. Although the test

developed by the Frye court was ultimately rejected when the Supreme

Court announced new rules regarding the admissibility of expert testi-

mony, the Frye court’s recognition of
the purpose behind admitting expert
testimony remains instructional:

[O]pinions of experts or skilled wit-

nesses are admissible in evidence in
those cases in which the matter of
inquiry is such that inexperienced

persons are unlikely to prove capable of
forming a correct judgment upon it, for
the reason that the subject-matter so

far partakes of a science, art, or

trade as to require a previous habit
or experience or study in it, in order
to acquire a knowledge of it.

When

the question involved does not lie

within the range of common experience

or common knowledge, but requires

or in opposition to any proposition.

the trial court as a gatekeeper, grant-

envision

degree of discretion in determining

Because it is the advocate’s nature to
the

goal

and

seek

the

means to achieve a desired result

(which tends to promote reliance on
unbridled use of evidence), the fact-

f i n d e r c a n b e l e d a w a y f ro m t h e
truth, rather than toward it.

Federal

Rule of Evidence 702 recognizes the

importance of placing admissible
evidence before the fact-finder that

will help her or him fulfill her or his
responsibility to reach a decision
based on all of the properly admitted evidence of the case.

A party

should not be rewarded for simply

ing the trial court a substantial

whether expert testimony should be
admitted.

focuses on whether the proffered
expert is qualified and whether the

identified testimony is both relevant
and reliable.

make and defend against Daubert

challenges both in the trial court and
on appeal.

I.

The Trial Court as

Gatekeeper and the

promote a conclusion inconsistent
ology reliably applied to the facts of

Further, as explained

in Part II, counsel should prepare to

finding a persuasive hired gun to

with sound principles and method-

In making an admissibil-

ity determination, the trial court

Daubert Inquiry

A proper understanding of the

a given case.

current law with respect to expert

that followed seek to address this

on the historical development of the

Rule 702, Daubert, and the cases

tension by balancing the need to

admit evidence that is helpful to the
jury with the need to exclude evidence that does not meet defined
s t a n d a r d s f o r a d m i s s i b i l i t y.

As

explained in Part I, Daubert and its

progeny have established the role of

testimony necessitates a brief primer

standards governing its admissibility.

Daubert established trial courts

as gatekeepers, vesting them with a
substantial amount of control over

which scientific, technical, and other

specialized knowledge the jury is
permitted to hear.

Daubert and later

special experience or special knowl-

edge, then the opinions of witnesses

skilled in that particular science, art,
or

trade

to

which

the

1.

Frye v. U.S., 293 F.1013, 1014 (1923) (quoting from defendant’s brief) (emphasis

2.

See Kudabeck v. Kroger Co., 338 F.3d 856, 860 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Expert testimony

question
1

relates are admissible in evidence.

It is, in the final analysis, neces-

sary for the trier of fact, as the fact-

(“The testimony offered the jury experience and knowledge beyond its own,

to carry out his or her duty to decide

Not all proffered expert testimony

serves the purpose recognized by the
Frye court.

and thus the district court did not err in admitting it.”).

Expert testi-

mony can supply this information.

Indeed, there is a natural

t e n s i o n b e t w e e n t h e d e s i re b y a

party to find an individual who will
c o n v e y a p a r t i c u l a r o p i n i o n ( f re -

quently not intended to help the

fact-finder make an objective decis i o n , b u t r a t h e r t o g e t a d e s i re d

assists the trier of fact when it provides information beyond the common

knowledge of the trier of fact.”); U.S. v. Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579, 593 (8th Cir. 2002)

finder, to have sufficient information
the submitted issues.2

added).
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cases made clear that a trial court

court first to determine whether an

m a y c o n s i d e r o n e o r m o re o f t h e

re a c h i n g a d e c i s i o n a n d t h a t i t s

scientific

mentioned when doing so will help

may consider a variety of factors in
admissibility determination is entitled to deference on appeal.

A.

Prior to the Supreme Court’s 1993

ated scientific evidence under the

“general acceptance” standard set
The Frye court had

determined that,

gained

the

Court

court could consider in making its
admissibility

determination.8

Daubert established the role of the

theory or technique.

acceptance in the particular field in
3

which it belongs.

Thus, under what came to be

Weisgram: Defining the

mony was admitted if the trial court

Daubert Inquiry

found that scientists in the relevant

scientific field generally accepted the
Notably, the Frye

exclusively applies to all experts or
in every case.”9

Finally, in Weisgram

In the years following Daubert,

the Supreme Court further defined

the trial court’s role and responsibil-

to whether the science underlying

Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), the Court

otherwise reliable.

Rather, the Frye

is the appropriate standard to be

nation was best left to the scientific

court’s decision to admit or exclude

some state courts today, the Frye test

court’s admissibility determination

too rigid and inflexible, resulting in

erence on appeal.

selves to make any determination as

ities.

First, in General Electric Co. v.

the proffered evidence was valid or

determined that abuse of discretion

test presumed that such a determi-

applied

community.

expert

when

re v i e w i n g

t e s t i m o n y.

Court determined that Federal Rule
appellate court to direct entry of

judgment as a matter of law when it
has determined that ex p e r t t e s t i mony was erroneously admitted at
trial and that the remaining, prop-

erly admitted evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

C.

Making an Admissibility
Determination

[i]f scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the

test did not require trial courts them-

Though still used in

cific factors neither necessarily nor

According to current Rule 702,

From Daubert to

B.

known as the Frye test, expert testi-

proffered theory.

and

munity’s general acceptance of the

general

‘flexible,’ and Daubert’s list of spe-

o f C i v i l P ro c e d u re 5 0 p e r m i t s a n

validation,7

relying solely on the scientific com-

made must be sufficiently estab-

ity,” but that “the test of reliability is

pointed to several factors the trial

ate

ity of expert evidence rather than

thing from which the deduction is

determine that testimony’s reliabil-

v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000), the

scrutinize the relevance and reliabil-

scientific principle or discovery, the

more specific factors that Daubert

method and supported by appropri-

tific evidence, requiring judges to

testimony

deduced from a well-recognized

have

The Court reasoned that,

trial court as a gatekeeper of scien-

while courts will go a long way in

to

understanding or determining a fact

must be derived by the scientific

Daubert decision, courts had evalu-

lished

is

an expert’s inference or assertion

Court as Gatekeeper

expert

that

to qualify as scientific knowledge,

Establishing the Trial

admitting

knowledge

intended to assist the trier of fact in
in issue.6

From Frye to Daubert:

forth in Frye.

expert is proposing to testify about

Thus,

a

trial

a

trial

evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an

expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
t e s t i f y t h e re t o i n t h e f o r m o f a n

opinion or otherwise, if (1) the test i m o n y i s b a s e d u p o n s u ff i c i e n t
facts or data, (2) the testimony is

the product of reliable principles

and methods, and (3) the witness
has applied the principles and

methods reliably to the facts of the
10

case.

To be admissible under Rule 702,

has been criticized by some as being

is given a substantial degree of def-

proposed testimony based on scien-

the exclusion of reliable and relevant

Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.

knowledge must meet three require-

generally accepted in the relevant

in accordance with the text of Rule

Next, in Kumho

evidence simply because it is not

137 (1999), the Court confirmed that,

scientific community.

702, Daubert applies not only to tes-

Seventy

years

after

Frye,

the

timony based on scientific knowl-

Daubert Court announced that a new

edge but also to testimony based on

bility of scientific evidence.

knowledge.

Simply put, the testimony

must be “useful to the finder of fact

in deciding the ultimate issue of
fact.”11

Second, the expert who will

be giving the testimony must be

to the Daubert Court’s analysis was

court concluded that “a trial court

Rule of Evidence 702 governs the

3.

Frye, 293 F. at 1014.

4.

Fed. R. Evid. 702 (1975).

5.

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.

trier of fact to understand the evi-

6.

Id. at 592.

issue, a witness qualified as an

7.

Id. at 590.

ence, training, or education, may

8.

See id. at 593-94.

9.

Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).

Rule 702 superseded Frye’s “general

10.

Fed. R. Evid. 702 (2000).

mined that the Rule requires a trial

11.

Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681, 686 (8th Cir. 2001).

admissibility of expert testimony.

At

the time Daubert was decided, Rule
702 provided as follows:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the

dence or to determine a fact in
expert by knowledge, skill, experi-

t e s t i f y t h e re t o i n t h e f o r m o f a n
4

opinion or otherwise.

The Daubert Court concluded that

acceptance” test.5

22

The Court deter-

specialized

First, the testimony must be

relevant.

technical

an acknowledgment that Federal

other

ments.

standard would govern the admissi-

Central

and

tific, technical, or other specialized

F u r t h e r, t h e K u m h o

qualified to assist the fact finder.

Finally, the testimony must be reli-

Rule 702 was amended in 2000.
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able.12

In making a reliability deter-

mination, the trial court may consider

a

variety

of

factors.

The

Daubert Court initially suggested

ble” and “fact specific,” and that

Daubert issues in the trial court and,

admissibility so long as the evidence

the trial court which will make suc-

there is no single requirement for

is found to be relevant and reliable.16

that trial courts consider the follow-

Indeed, trial courts are given “broad

(1) whether the theory or tech-

determine whether proffered evi-

(2) whether the theory or tech-

trial

ing factors:

latitude” in deciding how best to

nique can be and has been tested,

dence is reliable.17

nique has been subjected to peer
review and publication,

(3) the known or potential rate of

error of the particular scientific technique, and

(4) whether the theory or tech-

nique is generally accepted in the
relevant community.13

Additional factors for the trial

court’s consideration identified in
subsequent cases include:

(1) whether the expertise was

developed for litigation or naturally
flowed from the expert’s research,

(2) whether the expert ruled out

alternative explanations, and

(3) whether the expert sufficiently

connected the proposed testimony
with the facts of the case.14

The Eighth Circuit has empha-

sized that Rule 702 is a rule favoring
admissibility rather than exclusion.15

It is essential to recognize that

this inquiry is intended to be “flexi-

court

“must

ular case.” 18

customize

A Daubert hearing is

The only require-

opportunity

to

be

h e a rd

before a trial court makes an admissibility determination.

19

II.

Successfully Navigating
Daubert Issues

The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly

emphasized that a decision regard-

ing the admissibility of expert testimony is within the trial court’s dis-

cretion and will not be disturbed on
a p p e a l u n l e s s t h e re h a s b e e n a n
abuse of discretion. 20

d i s c re t i o n

will

be

An abuse of

found

“only

where the error is clear and prejudicial to the outcome of the proceeding.”21

A.

Anticipating and

Responding to Daubert

Issues in the Trial Court

its

ment is that the parties have an adequate

cess on appeal more likely.

Importantly, the

inquiry to fit the facts of each particnot mandatory.

second, that counsel take actions in

Successful navigation of the

potential Daubert issues in any case

requires, first, that counsel be prepared to anticipate and respond to

Whether representing a plaintiff

or a defendant, counsel should take

care to make wise strategic choices
with regard to anticipated expert tes-

timony in order to avoid the surprise
of an unanticipated negative Daubert
ruling.

Deciding whether and when

to raise a Daubert issue requires care-

ful consideration.
difficult.

This choice can be

For example, a plaintiff ’s

conclusion that she or he will leave it

up to the defendant to raise any
Daubert issues could backfire if the
plaintiff is later faced with a disqual-

ification of her or his expert after the
time for naming another expert has

expired and discovery has closed.

Or, a defendant’s choice to wait until
discovery has closed before making

a Daubert challenge to the plaintiff ’s
expert might prove to be unwise if

the defendant ultimately fails to prevail on its challenge and it is too late
for

the

expert.
It

is

defendant

to

employ

re c o m m e n d e d

that

an

any

Daubert issues be raised prior to

12.

Id. (setting out the three requirements for admissibility).

13.

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.

that Daubert hearings be scheduled

14.

Lauzon, 270 F.3d at 687 (listing some additional factors identified in subse-

be resolved in the discovery phase of

15.

trial, 22 and courts generally prefer

quent cases).

See, e.g., id. at 686 (rule is one of admissibility); Miles v. Gen. Motors Corp., 262

F.3d 720, 724 (8th Cir. 2001) (doubts regarding usefulness of expert’s testimony
generally resolved in favor of admissibility); Clark v. Heidrick, 150 F.3d 912, 915
(8th Cir. 1998) (same).

early so that any Daubert issues can

the case.

Preparation for a Daubert

hearing should include briefing followed by evidentiary support, if
permitted by the court.

Of course,

counsel should take care to make a
proper objection to any proffered

16.

Unrein v. Timesavers, Inc., 394 F.3d 1008, 1011 (8th Cir. 2005).

expert testimony on the record; oth-

17.

See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 142.

waived.23

18.

Jaurequi v. Carter Mfg. Co., Inc., 173 F.3d 1076, 1083 (8th Cir. 1999).

19.

See U.S. v. Solorio-Tafolla, 324 F.3d 964, 965 (8th Cir. 2003) (no requirement that
trial court hold hearing prior to qualifying an expert witness).

erwise, the objection may be deemed

B.

But see Group

Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 753, 761 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003)
(better to hold hearing).
20.

See, e.g., Nebraska Plastics, Inc. v. Holland Colors Ams., Inc., 408 F.3d 410, 415 (8th
Cir. 2005) (citing cases).

21.

Torbit v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 416 F.3d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 2005).

22.

See In re Air Crash at Little Rock Arkansas, 291 F.3d 503, 514 (8th Cir. 2002).

23.

Issues for Consideration
From review of all Eighth Circuit

c a s e s i n t e r p re t i n g a n d a p p l y i n g

Daubert and its progeny, it is clear
that

expert

testimony

may

be

attacked on a variety of grounds.

While a comprehensive list of these
grounds is beyond the scope of this

article, some of the more common
issues warranting counsel’s consideration are discussed here.

First,

counsel should not underestimate

See, e.g., McKnight v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d 1396, 1406-07 (8th Cir. 1994)

the importance of carefully review-

waived).

including both that of her or his own

(refusing to reach Daubert issue because, without an objection, matter is
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ing all potential expert testimony,

23

expert and that of the opposing
party’s expert.

clusions they generate, 32 both the

it is simply too tenuous.

have recognized that “conclusions

careful analysis by the trial court

tinct from one another.”33

sibility determination.

Counsel should be

Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit

considers all of the relevant facts of

and methodology are not entirely dis-

a s s u re d t h a t t h e e x p e r t ’ s o p i n i o n
the case.

Counsel should also exam-

ine whether the expert’s ultimate

conclusion is sufficiently supported
by the data on which the expert
relies.

Second, counsel should not

overlook the importance of making a

the

years

following

Indeed, in

Daubert,

the

Supreme Court noted that “[a] court

may conclude that there is simply too
great an analytical gap between the
data and the opinion proffered.”34

So,

strong and clear record before the

w h i l e a t r i a l c o u r t “ i s n o t f re e t o

bility determination is challenged on

of

trial court.

In the event the admissi-

appeal, a clear record will provide a

strong platform from which to either
p ro t e c t a f a v o r a b l e a d m i s s i b i l i t y
determination from fatal attack or

gain a reversal of an unfavorable
admissibility ruling.

1.

choose between the conflicting views

evidence when the link between the

opinion and the data used to support
24.

25.

w i l l b e p ro p e r l y e x c l u d e d b y t h e

failure to take into account all relevant facts of the particular case are
vulnerable to reversal on appeal.

26.

25

expert

expert.

and

any

opposing

A good strategy for insulat-

ing one’s own expert from a success-

ful Daubert attack begins with careful attention to the facts the expert

has considered and the conclusions
the expert has drawn.

It is far better

to spend time considering such mat-

See, e.g., Nebraska Plastics, 408 F.3d at 417 (trial court properly excluded testimony where expert’s calculation of future damages “failed to take into

should

the

be

usual

a case may be so “fundamentally
unsupported”

that

the

it

trial

must

be

ity, not admissibility); U.S. v. Vesey, 338 F.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 2003) (that wit-

give reason to doubt credibility, but does not render testimony inadmissible).
27.

Nebraska Plastics, 408 F.3d at 416.

28.

Larson v. Kempker, 414 F.3d 936, 940-41 (8th Cir. 2005).

c o u r t . 27

the jury).
29.

30.

it is not supported by “sufficient”

Further, testimony regarding a con-

clusion which does not logically flow

Thus, cases in which an

expert is permitted to express a con-

clusion which is clearly divorced from
the expert’s underlying data are vulnerable to reversal on appeal.31

While

31.

where no connection was established between alleged physical brain changes

32.

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.

33.

Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146; Jaurequi, 173 F.3d at 1082 n.3.

34.

Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.

See id. (nothing in Daubert or Rules of Evidence requires

a court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by

the ipse dixit of the expert); Children’s Broad. Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 245 F.3d

the Daubert Court concluded that the

methodology rather than on the con-

See, e.g., In re Air Crash, 291 F.3d at 514 (abuse of discretion to admit testimony
and the plaintiff ’s condition).

1008, 1018 (8th Cir. 2001) (same).

trial court’s focus must be on the
expert’s underlying principles and

excluded expert’s opinion that exposure to PCBs had contributed to human
relied).

from the expert’s underlying theory

will properly be excluded by the trial

See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144-45 (trial court properly

cancer because not logically supported by animal studies on which expert

facts, or when the facts of the case
contradict the expert opinion.29

But see Group Health Plan,

344 F.3d at 760 (some speculation permissible: “A certain amount of speculafatal to admission.”).

Importantly, expert

ble when it is too speculative, when

U.S. v. Rushing, 388 F.3d 1153, 1156 (8th Cir. 2004).

tion is necessary, an even greater amount is permissible . . . but too much is

abuse of discretion for the trial court

testimony may be found inadmissi-

See also, e.g., First Union

Nat’l Bank v. Benham, 423 F.3d 855, 862 (8th Cir. 2005) (testimony must be

excluded if it is fundamentally unsupported such that it offers no assistance to

the expert testimony is “so funda-

no assistance to the jury,” it is an

contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the tradi-

ness’s personal experience did not comport with his general observations may

According to the Eighth Circuit, if
mentally unreliable that it can offer

See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (“[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of

See, e.g., Marvin Lumber and Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 401 F.3d 901, 916 (8th

adversarial

to consider all of the relevant facts of

2004) (abuse of discretion to admit testimony because expert made unsupport-

Cir. 2005) (even post-Daubert, factual basis of expert opinion goes to credibil-

challenged

process,26 an expert opinion that fails

See, e.g., Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 363 F.3d 761, 777 (8th Cir.

tional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence”).

goes to credibility (not to admissibil-

24

own

aspects of the economic reality of the market).

tual basis for an expert’s opinion

c o u r t . 30

ful analysis with regard to her or his

(abuse of discretion to admit testimony because it did not incorporate all

While the general rule is that the fac-

to admit it. 28

he engages in this same kind of care-

rate); Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000)

tify notwithstanding the expert’s

by

pected admissibility ruling if she or

able assumptions and ignored other factors which may have affected growth

M o r e o v e r, c a s e s i n

which an expert is permitted to tes-

excluded

Counsel will

be more likely to avoid an unex-

(8th Cir. 2002) (same).

Testimony which fails to consider

t h ro u g h

and

when it is asked to make an admis-

account a plethora of specific facts”); Eckelkamp v. Beste, 315 F.3d 863, 868-69

all of the relevant facts of the case

and

principles

vant,”35 the trial court must exclude

Opinion

ity)

whose

methodology are reliable and rele-

Reviewing the Expert’s

t r i a l c o u r t . 24

experts

The issues identified here require

35.

Nat’l Bank of Commerce of El Dorado v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 191 F.3d

858, 862 (8th Cir. 1999).
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ters early in the litigation process

of the evidence and not to admissi-

sibility challenges.

to take the steps necessary to ensure

entific methodology is otherwise

invaluable because a record which

than to wait until it might be too late

the expert’s testimony can survive a
Daubert challenge.

This is especially

true in cases where an expert wishes

to base her or his opinions on an
a t t e m p t t o re p l i c a t e t h e e v e n t a t
issue.

When an expert proposes to

bility.

Thus, when a particular sci-

reliable, a challenge to the application of that methodology will not be

sustained unless the application of
the methodology was so altered as
to skew the methodology itself.37

Finally, expert testimony always

In the event of an

a p p e a l , s u c h a re c o rd c a n p ro v e
clearly sets forth specific reasons

supporting a favorable admissibility
determination helps to insulate the

r u l i n g f ro m s u c c e s s f u l a t t a c k o n
a p p e a l . 39

Thus,

counsel

should

e n s u re t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t m a k e s

findings on the record which sup-

conduct such experiments, counsel

should be evaluated in terms of a

conditions will be substantially the

dence be deemed helpful in assist-

Also note that, while the deferential

ent in the specific case.36

n a t i o n ? 38

D e l i b e r a t e a n d c a re f u l

Joiner makes it more likely that the

scrutiny should be applied when

the case can help counsel either

tion will be upheld on appeal, this

testimony.

increase the likelihood that a merito-

where a strong record in support of

expert’s testimony is sustained.

b e f o re t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t a n d i t

2.

determination inconsistent with that

same as the actual conditions pres-

ing the jury in making its determi-

s t a n d a rd o f re v i e w m a n d a t e d b y

of

review of expert opinions early in

trial court’s admissibility determina-

reviewing expected opposing expert

repel a successful Daubert attack or

general principle does not hold true

sion to challenge opposing expert

rious

o r to e xc l u d e e xpe r t te s t i m o n y i s

Of

course,

this

same

kind

With regard to the deci-

testimony, a word of caution is warr a n t e d re g a rd i n g t h e d i s t i n c t i o n
between a challenge to a particular

scientific methodology and a challenge to the application of that scientific methodology.

challenge

to

Will the evi-

port its admissibility determination.

should ensure that the experiment

fundamental question:

an

opposing

The Importance of a Clear

Record

In addition to the measures men-

Generally, the

tioned above, counsel should strive

tific methodology goes to the weight

trial court with regard to any admis-

alleged faulty application of a scien-

to make a clear record before the

appears that the trial court made a
re c o rd . 4 0

the reasons compelling admission or

exclusion of the evidence can help to
ensure that an unfavorable admissibility determination is corrected on
appeal.

36.

38.

illustrate

similar the conditions of the experiment must be to the actual accident condi-

credibility, rather than on the relia-

2005) (the more experiment appears to simulate accident at issue, the more

See, e.g., U.S. v. Gipson, 383 F.3d 689, 697 (8th Cir. 2004) (faulty application of
method goes to weight of DNA evidence, not to admissibility).

See, e.g., Unrein, 394 F.3d at 1012 (question is whether expert’s opinion is suffi-

ciently grounded to be helpful to the jury); Nichols v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 154
F.3d 875, 883 (8th Cir. 1998) (testimony was not proper under Rule 702; crossed
over line of what is helpful to jury).

39.

See, e.g., Group Health Plan, 344 F.3d at 760 (affirming because, even if would
have come to different conclusion, record indicates court could not conclude

41.

a

trial

court

has

bility

of

her

or

his

t e s t i m o n y. 4 1

Finally, a clear record can be used to
d em ons trate on appeal t h a t , c o n trary to the trial court’s apparent

belief, a particular expert was or was
not qualified to give the opinion
offered.42

III.

Conclusion

Rule 702, Daubert, and the cases

that followed have established the

role of the trial court as a gatekeeper

ing the record and utilizing abuse of discretion standard).

court

See, e.g., Lauzon, 270 F.3d at 696 (examination of record led to conclusion that

this obligation.

1287, 1297-98 (8th Cir. 1997) (same); U.S. v. Iron Cloud, 171 F.3d 587, 590 (8th

challenges, both in the trial court

and have made clear that the trial
is

a ff o rd e d

a

substantial

amount of discretion in performing
I n p re p a r i n g t o

evidence should have been admitted); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d

make and defend against Daubert

Cir. 1999) (record revealed that trial court failed to follow Daubert procedure).

and

See, e.g., Vesey, 338 F.3d at 917-18 (by concentrating on expert’s contradictory,

her or his own expert as well as that

evasive, and speculative responses, trial court erroneously shifted inquiry to
credibility of witness).

42.

that

improperly focused on an expert’s

that trial court committed clear error in judgment); Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 191

F.3d at 864 (scales tipped in favor of affirming the district court after review-

40.

Moreover, a clear record can

See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Canon USA, Inc., 394 F.3d 1054, 1060 (8th Cir.

tions).
37.

T h u s , m a k i n g a s t ro n g

record in the trial court supporting

See, e.g., Benham, 423 F.3d at 862 (trial court’s decision to exclude expert testi-

mony because expert’s conclusions were based on own experience was abuse
of discretion); Larson, 414 F.3d at 941-42 (trial court’s decision to exclude testimony of expert for lack of education or training regarding second-hand smoke

was abuse of discretion given that expert was qualified on numerous bases);
Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Beelman River Terminals, Inc., 254 F.3d 706, 715

(8th Cir. 2001) (abuse of discretion to allow hydrologist to testify as expert

regarding safe warehousing practices because he lacked the education,
employment, or other practical personal experiences necessary to do so).
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on

appeal,

counsel

should

examine the expected testimony of

of any opposing expert, bearing in
mind the dispositive issues of the

witness’s qualifications and the relevancy and reliability of the witness’s
testimony.

Any successful strategy

for dealing with Daubert begins with
a t h o ro u g h u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e

a n a l y s i s D a u b e r t re q u i re s a t r i a l
court to undertake and a diligent

effort to ensure the record reflects

the extent to which such an analysis
was undertaken.
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